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CHARTING A PATH FORWARD: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR 
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION 








 On March 18, 2021, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) launched 
two short-range ballistic missiles in its first missile test in a year and its first provocation of the 
Biden administration.1  North Korea’s missile test should not have come as a surprise to the 
experienced diplomats Biden is appointing to the State department, North Korea has a noted 
history of provoking incoming U.S. presidential administrations with weapons tests that increase 
tensions on the Korean peninsula and force the new administration to respond .2  While the new 
administration has understandably been preoccupied with the faltering U.S. economy and its 
domestic response to the Covid-19 pandemic, North Korea’s recent test serves as a reminder that  
nuclear North Korea is not a problem that can stay on the backburner for long.  In response, 
President Biden rebuked the missile tests with a vague threat of ‘responses’ if North Korea 
continues to escalate tensions amid stalled negotiations.3 Such a progression is illustrative of the 
cycle of provocation that has plagued U.S.–North Korean diplomacy.4  As the cycle goes, North 
Korea provokes the international community to gain leverage, bring the parties to the table, and 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2017, Davidson College. 
1 Choe Sang-Hun, ‘Power for Power’: North Korea Returns to a Show of Force, N.Y. Times (Mar. 24, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/world/asia/north-korea-ballistic-missiles.html. 
2 Editorial Board, Kim Jong Un likes to provoke new U.S. presidents. Biden’s team should be prepared. Wash. Post 
(Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/biden-north-korea-policy-
kim/2021/01/22/c3756e86-5c10-11eb-b8bd-ee36b1cd18bf_story.html.  
3 Hyung-Jin Kim, North Korea Confirms Missile Test as Biden Warns of a Response, Time (Mar. 26, 2021), 
https://time.com/5950249/north-korea-missile-tests-biden/.  
4 William J. Perry, Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North Korean Nuclear Crises, 607 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. 
& Soc. Sci. 78-86 (2006) (pointing out that North Korea will manufacture nuclear crises to bring the international 
community to the negotiating table and extract concessions with promises to halt weapons testing while continuing 
on the path to a nuclear weapon).  
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extract concessions in exchange for briefly easing tensions or halting their nuclear programs, 
only to renege and begin the cycle again.5  
Arriving at an effective approach to North Korea has been an intractable problem for the 
United States, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained in his confirmation hearing when 
he acknowledged that “North Korea is a hard problem that has plagued administration after 
administration, and it’s a problem that has not gotten better, in fact, it’s gotten worse.”6 Indeed, 
for over three decades, North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear arsenal has posed a unique challenge 
to both the United States’ foreign policy objectives and the international regime for the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.  From Jimmy Carter to Donald Trump, while the United 
States has been able to hinder North Korea’s nuclear weapons program at various stages, no 
administration has been able to prevent North Korea’s steady march towards an expanded 
nuclear arsenal and modernized missile fleet.7  The North Korean regime has demonstrated the 
ability to endure the significant pressure of an intricate sanctions regime and a willingness to 
pass that economic suffering on to its people in order to maintain the nuclear arsenal that North 
Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un views as essential to the regime’s survival.8   
As of today, North Korea has between thirty to forty nuclear warheads, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles capable of carrying such warheads, a stockpile of chemical and biological 
weapons agents, and the ability to produce enough fissile material for six or seven more nuclear 
 
5 Id. 
6 Nominations: Hearing on the Honorable Antony J Blinken of New York, to be Secretary of State Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 117th Cong. (Jan. 19, 2021) (statement of Antony Blinken, nominee). 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/nominations-011921.  
7 See, e.g., Wendy Sherman & Evans Revere, How to Stop Kim Jong-Un: Why we’ve fallen short and why that’s no 
longer an option, TIME (Feb. 17, 2017) https://time.com/north-korea-opinion/ (“Successive U.S. Administrations 
have tried various strategies to thwart the dangerous trajectory of the regime. Some have made progress, only to be 
set back by North Korean perfidy, by changes in policy direction and by cautious partners and allies in the region 
who wanted a different approach. We now know that for much of this time Pyongyang was working to preserve and 
expand its nuclear program.”). 
8 Choe Sang-Hun, Sanctions are Hurting North Korea. Can They Make Kim Give In?, N.Y. Times (Apr. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/20/world/asia/north-korea-trump-sanctions-kim-jong-un.html.  
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weapons each year.9 Coupled with Kim Jong-un’s recent vow at a rare Workers’ Party Congress 
to further strengthen North Korea’s nuclear deterrence, and his declaration that North Korea is a 
responsible nuclear weapons state, it is likely that the Biden administration is inheriting a 
problem in which the complete denuclearization of North Korea is more of a necessary public 
stance rather than a realistic solution.10  However, just because the complete denuclearization of 
North Korea may be unrealistic as a short-term goal, it does not mean that diplomacy and 
engagement with North Korea are no longer worthwhile pursuits.  As distinguished professor and 
North Korea expert Victor Cha aptly put it, “North Korea is the land of lousy options,” but lousy 
options do not allow us to opt out, ignore the problem, and hope it simply goes away.11 As the 
Biden administration nears the conclusion of its “full review of the U.S. approach to North 
Korea” and the nuclear threat it poses, the timing is apt to review the basis for nuclear 
nonproliferation in international law and address the steps the Biden administration should take 
in regard to North Korea.12 
This paper will show that North Korea has slipped through the cracks of the international 
regime for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and argue that the Biden administration 
should (1) maintain a public posture of complete denuclearization of North Korea to sustain the 
nonproliferation regime in international law; (2) continue to pursue and enforce the economic 
 
9 Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea’s Arsenal Has Grown Rapidly. Here’s What’s in It, N.Y. Times (Mar. 26, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/world/asia/north-korea-arsenal-nukes.html.  
10 Choe, Sang-Hun, Kim Jong-un Uses Party Congress to Double Down on Nuclear Program, N.Y. Times (Jan. 13, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/asia/north-korea-kim-jong-un-
nuclear.html?searchResultPosition=1; See also, Anna Fifield, North Korea is a nuclear state. But can the U.S. 
accept that?, Wash. Post (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-korea-is-a-
nuclear-state-but-can-the-us-accept-that/2017/12/09/6fd76d7c-da79-11e7-8e5f-ccc94e22b133_story.html; For 
background on the Worker’s Party of Korea and Kim Jong-un’s regime see Eleanor Albert, North Korea’s Power 
Structure, Council on Foreign Relations (June 17, 2020) https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-
structure (detailing the dynastic dictatorship of the Kim family, Kim Jong-un’s authoritarian regime, and the history 
of the Worker’s Party). 
11 Ami Bera and Victor Cha, A Small Deal Within a Big Deal, Center for Strategic & International Studies (Jul. 8, 
2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/small-deal-within-big-deal-0.  




sanctions regime against North Korea; (3) reengage with Japan and South Korea and commit to 
trilateral defense and deterrence measures to contain a nuclear North Korea; and (4) convey a 
willingness to engage Kim Jong-un in high-level diplomacy and pursue proportional sanctions 
relief for verifiable steps towards denuclearization.13 Part I of this paper will discuss the 
foundations for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in international law. Part II will 
examine President Trump’s approach to North Korea as a juxtaposition to the multilateral 
approaches of previous presidential administrations. And lastly, Part III will address how the 
Biden administration should move forward with regard to North Korea by maintaining a public 
posture of complete denuclearization, working with the United States’ strategic partners in the 
region towards extended deterrence, and engaging North Korea if and when they display a 
readiness to make meaningful concessions in regard to their nuclear program and current nuclear 
arsenal.  
I. The Foundations of Nuclear Nonproliferation in International Law 
 
The legal basis for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in international law lies 
largely with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and economic 
sanctions levied through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).14  The NPT imposes 
obligations on each of the signed parties and such obligations are enforced through sanctions 
from the UNSC.15  Section I.A explores the language and goals of the NPT, its alleged 
weaknesses, and North Korea’s checkered relationship with the Treaty. Section I.B then 
evaluates the underpinnings of the United Nations sanctions regime and surveys the effectiveness 
of sanctions on North Korea. 
 
13 China is an integral part of the conversation and any potential approach to addressing a nuclear North Korea, and 
this paper addresses China’s role in regards to sanctions implementation in Section I.B and how China will affect the 
path forward for the Biden administration in Section III. 
14 See Paul Lettow, Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 6-8 (2010) (Explaining the international 
legal foundation for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and arguing that the current regime is falling short). 
15 Id.  
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A. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
 
The NPT is widely regarded as the foundation of the international regime for the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.16  Understanding that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,” the NPT was drafted to prevent an unstable 
arms race from consuming the international order as ever increasing numbers of nations attempt 
to acquire nuclear forces.17  Opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, a total 
of 191 States have joined the NPT.18 Article VIII of the NPT envisaged a review of the Treaty 
every five years, and at the review conference on May 11, 1995, the State parties decided to 
extend the NPT indefinitely.19  
The NPT established a dual structure that is colloquially known as the Treaty’s ‘grand 
bargain,’ under which the Treaty differentiates between states already in possession of nuclear 
weapons (i.e., nuclear weapons states (NWS)), and those not in possession of such weapons (i.e., 
non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS)), and imposes distinct obligations dependent on a state’s 
classification.20  The NPT defines NWS as the states that had manufactured and exploded a 
nuclear weapon or other nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967; a select group that encompasses 
the five permanent members of the UNSC in China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
 
16 See Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2009) (Analyzing 
the international nonproliferation regime and arguing that the current system is not sufficien t in itself to address 
nuclear nonproliferation); Nuclear Weapons: Strengthening the International Legal Regime (Ida Caracciolo, et al. 
eds., 2012) (Scrutinizing the effectiveness and limits of the nonproliferation regime based on the NPT and raising 
potential future challenges to the nonproliferation regime); Gro Nystuen, Stuart Casey-Maslen & Annie Golden 
Bersagel, Nuclear Weapons Under International Law (2014) (Drawing upon various scholars and contributors to 
critically assess the NPT and the nonproliferation regime). 
17 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Preamble, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 
161.; See also M.A. Kaplan, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: its rationale, prospects and possible impact on 
international law, Journal of Public Law 18, 1-20, at 3 (1969). 
18 United Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2021) (hereinafter “NPT”).  
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 9 (2009) (“This quid 
pro quo relationship of differential and reciprocal obligations between nuclear weapon states and non -nuclear 
weapon states, which the NPT came to codify, has become known as the “grand bargain” of the NPT”). 
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the United States.21 The ‘grand bargain’ was essential to the Treaty’s ratification in 1970, and the 
dichotomy between NWS and NNWS remains a fundamental aspect of the Treaty’s continued 
efficacy.22  
Five essential articles of the NPT lay out the framework of the ‘grand bargain’ and 
impose obligations on the member states. Article I of the NPT establishes the nonproliferation 
obligations of the NWS parties:  
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control 
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way 
to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control 
over such weapons or explosive devices.”23   
 
Article II obliges the NNWS parties: 
not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive 
devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any 
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.24 
 
Article III establishes the safeguards and monitoring system under the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) of peaceful uses of nuclear technology.25  Article III obliges the NNWS 
to “accept safeguards as set forth in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency,” and allow the IAEA inspectors to verify that parties to the Treaty are not 
diverting nuclear energy from permissible peaceful uses to prohibited nuclear weapons.26 
 
21 See Nystuen, Casey-Maslen, & Bersagel, Nuclear Weapons Under International Law 376 (2014). 
22 Nuclear Weapons: Strengthening the International Legal Regime 5 (Ida Caracciolo et al. eds. 2012).  
23 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article 1, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 
161 (hereinafter “NPT”). 
24 NPT, Art. II. 
25 Id. Art. III. 
26 Id. 
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Article IV guarantees the right of NNWS parties to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy.27 
And lastly, Article VI addresses disarmament: 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control.28 
 
Together, the above articles establish the three pillars of the NPT; (1) NWS agree not to 
assist any NNWS in acquiring nuclear weapons and are obligated to pursue disarmament; (2) 
NNWS agree not to manufacture or acquire their own nuclear weapons; and (3) NNWS are free 
to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear technology under the watchful eye of the IAEA and the NWS 
will encourage international cooperation in furthering such goals.29 
1. Pros and Cons of the NPT Framework 
 More than five decades after its ratification, the NPT has largely received plaudits for 
creating an international norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, establishing a legal 
context for the reduction of existing nuclear weapons and the reduction of United States and 
Russian nuclear stockpiles in particular, and limiting the overall number of nuclear weapons 
states.30 Today, only nine countries are currently in possession of nuclear weapons including the 
formally recognized NWS of the NPT and the “final four” nuclear weapons states that exist 
outside of the NPT’s framework: India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.31 India, Pakistan and 
 
27 Id, Art. IV (“Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty 
to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty”). 
28 Id, Art. VI. 
29 See Rohan Mishra, Note, Toward a Nuclear Recognition Threshold, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 1035, (2020); Daniel H. 
Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 9 (2009).  
30 See Michael O’Hanlon, Robert Einhorn, Steven Pifer & Frank A. Rose, Experts assess the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect, Brookings (Mar. 3, 2020) 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/03/experts-assess-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-
50-years-after-it-went-into-effect/.  
31 See David S. Jonas, Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the “Final Four” Join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
as Non-Nuclear Weapons State While Retaining Their Nuclear Weapons?, 2005 Mich St. L. Rev. 417, at 418-419. 
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Israel never joined the NPT as state parties, while North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 
2003.32 Viewed against the belief in the 1960s espoused by President John F. Kennedy, who 
foresaw the “possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world 
in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons,” the NPT has been a relative 
success.33 International peace and security is not balancing on the knife’s edge feared by 
President Kennedy, where twenty-five states could instigate nuclear war with the press of a 
button, and the NPT is largely to thank for that reality.34   
 However, the NPT is not without its faults. Part of the grand bargain rests on the Article 
VI agreement obliging all parties to the treaty, but really just the NWS, to move towards 
disarmament complete disarmament.35 But while Article VI creates an obligation of 
disarmament, it does so in exceedingly vague terms, and only requires the state parties to “purse 
negotiations in good faith” toward disarmament “at an early date.”36 Article VI’s equivocal 
language offers no concrete terms to which NNWS can point in order to hold the NWS 
accountable in carrying out their end of the bargain.  And while the U.S. and Russia have 
significantly reduced their nuclear arsenals, they pursued bilateral arms limitations and 
reductions “primarily because they believed such arms agreements would serve their own 
security interests, not because they were obliged to under the NPT.”37  Indeed, nuclear weapons 
continue to be the basis of the NWS’s national security and deterrence policies and none of the 
 
32 Id.  
33 Text of President John F. Kennedy’s News Conference in Foreign and Domestic Affairs , (Mar. 22, 1963) (quoted 
in E.B. Firmage, The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, American Journal of International Law 63, 
711-46 (1969). 
34 See O’Hanlon, supra note 30.  
35 NPT, Art. VI. 
36 Id. 
37O’Hanlon, supra note 30. 
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nine countries currently in possession of nuclear weapons have shown a willingness to give them 
up any time soon.38   
Harvard Kennedy School Director Steven E. Miller has identified several challenges to 
the NPT that arise out of the NPT’s “Article VI stalemate.”39 Miller advances the idea that the 
Treaty’s seemingly indefinite “bifurcation of the world into nuclear haves and have-nots” makes 
the long term viability of the grand bargain untenable.40 Miller posits that the longer the NWS 
maintain their nuclear arsenals and “routinely proclaim that such weapons are essential to their 
defense postures, that they provide unique and crucial security benefits and that they must be 
retained indefinitely,” the harder it will become for NWS to maintain that NNWS cannot pursue 
their own nuclear arsenals.41 Considering the centrality of the grand bargain to the continued 
viability of the Treaty and the concerns that arise out of the Article VI stalemate, critics of the 
NPT have argued that the Treaty should have addressed the nuclear disarmament process in more 
concrete terms.42 
2. North Korea’s Brief Stint as a State Party to the NPT 
North Korea began its nuclear program in the 1950s.43  With significant technical 
assistance from the Soviet Union, North Korea established the Yongbyon Nuclear Research 
Center with a Soviet nuclear research reactor to produce radioisotopes and train personnel.44  In 
the early 1970s, North Korea acquired plutonium reprocessing technology from the Soviet Union 
and established uranium processing facilities necessary to create the fissile material needed for a 
 
38 See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection, (Dec. 15, 2020) 
https://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/nuclear-disarmament/.  
39 Steven E. Miller, Proliferation, Disarmament and the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in Nuclear 
Proliferation and International Security at 64 (Morton Bremer Maerli et al. eds., 2007).  
40 Id.  
41 Id, at 65. 
42 See Caracciolo, supra note 22, at 11. 




nuclear weapon.45  North Korea underwent a significant expansion of their nuclear program in 
the early 1980s and began construction on a 5MWe nuclear reactor.46 North Korea told the IAEA 
that the Yongbyon reactor would be used solely for electricity generation, but experts were 
skeptical as the 5MWe reactor could easily be repurposed to produce the fissile material for a 
nuclear weapon.47 
In 1985, as North Korea neared completion of the 5MWe nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, it 
signed the NPT under international pressure.48  However, North Korea did not sign a nuclear 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA as required by Article III of the NPT until 1992.49 When 
IAEA inspectors finally gained access to North Korea’s nuclear facilities, they detected 
discrepancies suggesting that North Korea had secretly produced enough fissile material for one 
or two nuclear weapons after they had assented to the NPT.50 When IAEA inspectors requested 
further inspections, North Korea balked and threatened to withdraw from the NPT entirely and 
submitted notice of its withdrawal.51 Amid heightened tensions the U.S. and North Korea came 
to an agreement in 1994 known as the Agreed Framework, where the U.S. agreed to assist North 
Korea with fuel shipments and build two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors in the county in 
return for North Korea coming back to full compliance with its obligations under the NPT and 
IAEA.52 At the time, the Agreed Framework was viewed as a relatively successful mechanism 
 
45 Id. 
46 Yongbyon 5MWe Reactor, NTI (Last updated Jul. 2018) https://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/766/.  
47 Id. 
48 See Daniel Wertz, Issue Brief: The U.S., North Korea, and Nuclear Diplomacy, The National Committee on North 
Korea, 6 (Oct. 2018) https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/issue-briefs/US_DPRK_Relations.pdf (“In 1985, as 
North Korea neared completion of the 5MWe reactor, it signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty under Soviet (and 
indirectly, American) pressure”).  
49 See Frederic L. Kirgis, North Korea’s Withdrawal From the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, American Society 
of International Law, (Jan. 24, 2003) https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/2/north-koreas-withdrawal-
nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty.  
50 See Wertz, supra note 48, at 7. 
51 Id.  
52 Id, at 8. 
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for containing the North Korean nuclear threat by freezing North Korea’s activities at the 
Yongbyon nuclear complex and providing stability to U.S.–North Korean relations.53  
For the next nine years, the Agreed Framework remained in place amidst rising tensions 
due to North Korea’s ballistic missile program and clandestine efforts to acquire a uranium 
enrichment.54  In October 2002, evidence of North Korea’s covert nuclear operations was 
mounting and the Bush administration sent a delegation to confront North Korea over the issue.55 
In talks, North Korea confirmed the existence of its clandestine nuclear program.56 Finding 
North Korea to be in violation of the agreed framework, the U.S. then halted shipments of fuel, 
and by late December of 2002, North Korea retaliated by expelling the IAEA inspectors, lifting 
the freeze on its nuclear program, and announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT.57 On 
January 10, 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT, effective as of January 
11, 2003.58 
North Korea justified its withdrawal on Article X of the NPT. Article X guarantees each 
Party as follows: 
In exercising its national sovereignty… the right to withdraw from 
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the 
subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests 
of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other 
parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council 
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of 




53 Jonathan D. Pollack, The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework, Naval War College 
Review, Vol. LVI, No. 3 at 42-43 (2003) (“By discarding the Agreed Framework, the United States and North 
Korea decided that they preferred living with future uncertainties and dangers to sustaining or modifying an 
imperfect formula that had capped Pyongyang’s nascent nuclear weapons program for nearly a decade”).  
54 Id. 
55 See Wertz, supra note 48, at 10. 
56 See Perry, supra note 4, at 82-83. 
57 Id, at 83-84. 
58 International Atomic Energy Agency, Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, (last accessed Apr. 4, 2021) 
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards.  
59 NPT, Art. X. 
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A withdrawal relies completely on the “discretionary decision of the relevant state, and other 
state parties do not submit it [the withdrawal] to any political or legal evaluation.”60 
Extraordinary events should theoretically provide a hurdle to the withdrawal from the NPT, but 
North Korea’s withdrawal indicates otherwise. North Korea’s stated reason for withdrawal from 
the NPT was the U.S.’s alleged ‘hostile policy’ toward North Korea, as the U.S. had identified 
North Korea as a potential nuclear target in a military contingency and threated a blockade and 
military action.61 Whether North Korea’s allegations held any truth is immaterial for the 
purposes of Article X, the NPT’s withdrawal provision is simply a means “through which states 
could denounce the NPT one it is considered to no longer correspond to their interests.”62 As 
written, Article X has been criticized for providing any party who wishes to withdraw from the 
treaty with an easily accessible escape hatch.63  And with an international legal system 
predicated largely on state sovereignty and consent, North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT 
forecloses the possibility for nonproliferation enforcement under the NPT’s terms.64 In the 
aftermath of North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, the next section now turns to the UNSC 
sanctions regime. 
B. The United Nations Security Council Sanctions Regime 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides the legal framework under which the 
UNSC can take enforcement actions “with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, 
and acts of aggression.”65 Specifically, Chapter VII Article 39 provides that the “Security 
 
60 Caracciolo, supra note 22, at 5. 
61 See Kirgis, supra note 49. 
62 Caracciolo, supra note 22, at 5.  
63 Matthew Liles, Did Kim Jong-Il Break the Law? A Case Study on How North Korea Highlights the Flaws of the 
Non-Proliferation Regime, 33 N.C.J. Int’l. & Com. Reg. 103, 116 (2007). 
64 Id; For background information on sta te sovereignty in international law see Samantha Besson, Sovereignty, 
Oxford Public Int’l Law (Apr. 2011) https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1472 (“Most of the other, if not all institutions and principles of international law rely, directly or 
indirectly, on State sovereignty”). 
65 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, available at https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-
charter/full-text (last accessed May 2, 2021).  
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Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."66 
Article 42 is a rarely used enforcement mechanism relating to the UNSC’s authorization of the 
use of force when non-violent means are not an adequate remedy.67 Sanctions measures, under 
Article 4, “encompasses a large array of enforcement measures that do not involve the use of 
armed force.”68 Under Article 41 the  
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use 
of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, 
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply 
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption 
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, 
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.69 
 
On October 9, 2006, North Korea detonated its first nuclear weapon.70 In response, the 
UNSC unanimously passed its first sanction on North Korea under Article 41, UNSC Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1718.71 UNSCR 1718 condemned North Korea’s nuclear test as a clear threat to 
international peace and security, demanded that North Korea return to the NPT, decided that 
North Korea “shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, 
verifiable and irreversible manner,” and banned any supply of heavy weaponry, missile 
technology, fissile material, and luxury goods to North Korea.72 In addition to the sanctions, 
Resolution 1718 created the 1718 Committee, consisting of representatives from each country of 
 
66 Id, Ch. VII Art. 39. 
67 United Nations Security Council, Repertoire of Security Council Practice, (last visited Apr. 6, 2021) 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/actions.  
68 United Nations Security Council, Sanctions, (last visited Apr. 6, 2021) 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information.  
69 See U.N. Charter, supra note 65, Ch. VII Art. 41.  
70 David E. Sanger, North Koreans Say They Tested Nuclear Device, N.Y. Times (Oct. 9, 2006) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/09korea.html.  
71 See Eleanor Albert, What to Know About Sanctions on North Korea, Council on Foreign Relations, (Jul 16, 2019) 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea.  
72 Security Council resolution 1718, S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006). 
 14 
the security council, and directed the committee to monitor the effectiveness of sanctions against 
North Korea and provide periodic reports to the UNSC.73 Since 2006, the UNSC has imposed 
eight additional sanctions on North Korea that reiterate the terms of UNSCR 1718 and enact 
increasingly punitive restrictions.74  
The U.S. has also imposed unilateral sanctions that often target a wider scope of 
economic activities and individuals both in order to combat North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs in general, and to respond to specific North Korean acts of provocation, for 
example North Korean cyberattacks, human rights violations, and money laundering.75 The U.S. 
has imposed unilateral sanctions on North Korea and certain individuals and entities through 
both executive orders and legislation such as the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement 
Act and the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.76 The Executive Orders 
and legislation permits the President to sanction any person or entity involved in the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and seek to restrict North Korea’s access to the U.S. and international 
financial systems.77  
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Despite the intricate sanctions regime enacted by the UNSC, the overall efficacy of 
sanctions on North Korea is unclear. Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland have argued that an 
authoritarian regime such as North Korea is a “hard target” for economic sanctions because of its 
willingness and ability to impose the costs of sanctions on their citizens.78 As such, living 
conditions in North Korea are allegedly abysmal.79  North Korea is one of the world’s most 
repressive states and Kim Jong-un’s regime restricts “all civil and political liberties. . . prohibits 
all organized political opposition, independent media, civil society,” routinely uses arbitrary 
arrests and punishment of crimes, and extracts forced labor from its population, among other 
human rights violations.80 
Similarly, since North Korea has almost completely shut down its borders in response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, Daniel Wertz has argued that North Korea’s “willingness to bear 
considerable self-inflicted economic pain to avoid the perceived national security threat posed by 
the pandemic raises fundamental questions about the coercive power of sanctions, even if 
meaningfully enforced .”81  Indeed, as Kim Jong-un’s regime has demonstrated in its response to 
the pandemic, North Korea’s perceived national security interests clearly take precedence over 
its economic interests, despite the cost.82  
UNSCR sanctions rely on individual enforcement from each of the U.N member states, 
which is often uneven, especially in regard to Chinese enforcement of the North Korean 
sanctions.83 China is by far and away North Korea’s largest trade partner, and with a primary 
objective of regime stability in North Korea, China’s tightening or relaxation of sanctions likely 
 
78 See Stephen Haggard & Marcus Noland, Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea (2017).  
79 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2019: North Korea  (2019) https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-
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reflects China’s interests and policy objectives rather than requirements mandated by the UNSC 
resolutions.84 Indeed, while consistently voting in favor of the UNSC sanctions against North 
Korea, when it comes to implementation “China has repeatedly dragged its feet over the years, 
dramatically increasing its trade with North Korea between 2006 and 2014.”85  Nicholas Miller 
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has likened China’s actions to providing 
North Korea with ‘shelter’ from the international sanctions regime.86  Economic sanctions were 
always going to face long odds of success in preventing North Korea from obtaining nuclear 
weapons as long as China was willing to account for over eighty percent of North Korea’s 
international trade, in effect insulating North Korea from the international economy and 
undermining the spirit and effectiveness of the UNSC sanctions.87   
Scholars have also argued that North Korean sanctions simply serve to embolden Mr. 
Kim to continue to bolster his nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to a perceived hostile policy, and that 
sanctions are simply futile measures when it comes to convincing North Korea to give up its 
nuclear weapons.88 On the flip side, scholars have pointed out that sanctions signal to the 
international community at large that North Korea’s behavior will not go unpunished, and that 
any country contemplating following in North Korea’s footsteps can expect similar 
condemnation from the international community.89 And finally, sanctions, when pursued 
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simultaneously with diplomacy, can be a bargaining chip and provide leverage in the form of 
sanctions relief for commensurate actions towards denuclearization in negotiations.90 And Victor 
Cha notes that “we have to remember that sanctions always receive criticism as an ineffective 
policy instrument until they are proven to work,” and the 2016 and 2017 sanctions have been the 
harshest and most comprehensive to date, and are “having an undeniable bite on the regime.”91   
However, as the most recent 1718 Committee report notes, North Korea continues to 
“maintain and develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of Security Council 
resolutions,” and is expected to continue with state sponsored sanctions evasion once it reopens 
its borders from its self-imposed COVID-19 lockdown.92 And even still, in its locked down state, 
North Korea is still evading sanctions and smuggling illicit oil with China’s help.93  North Korea 
has managed to remain outside of the legal framework of the NPT and has resisted the 
international pressure of the UNSC sanctions regime to obtain nuclear weapons, raising 
questions about the efficacy of the current legal framework for nuclear nonproliferation under 
international law.  
II. Breaking the Cycle: President Trump’s Approach to North Korea 
Before turning to how the Biden administration should handle North Korea moving 
forward, it is necessary to address where U.S.–North Korea relations currently stand, and 
particularly how President Trump’s unique approach to North Korea has framed the issue for 
President Biden moving forward. Before delving into President Trump’s approach, Section II(A) 
will briefly detail the six party talks and Section II(B) will address the Obama administration’s 
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‘strategic patience’ approach to North Korea. Section II(C) will then discuss President Trump’s 
inimitable style that has left the Biden administration with the North Korea that stands today.  
A. The Six Party Talks and the Recurring Cycle of Diplomacy and Provocation 
Following the collapse of the Agreed Framework and North Korea’s withdrawal from the 
NPT, the U.S. adopted a dual-track policy of diplomacy and economic pressure.94  In August 
2003, China and the U.S. engaged North Korea in trilateral discussions concerning North 
Korea’s nuclear program, and the talks quickly grew to include South Korea, Japan, and 
Russia.95 North Korea continued to produce weapons grade plutonium as the six parties 
intermittently engaged in discussions with few substantive outcomes until September 19, 2005, 
when the six parties announced a Joint Statement on Denuclearization.96 In the 2005 Joint 
Statement, the parties reaffirmed the overarching goal of the verifiable denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsula and North Korea committed to abandoning its nuclear weapons and nuclear 
program and recommitting to the NPT in return for economic assistance.97 The Six Parties 
agreed to take coordinated steps in a phased manner “in line with the principle of ‘commitment 
for commitment, action for action.’”98 However, the agreed framework of the Joint Statement 
was never implemented. Soon after the Joint Statement was announced, the U.S. imposed 
financial sanctions on North Korean money laundering in Macau, which provoked a strong 
reaction from Pyongyang and resulted in North Korea pulling out of the discussions and 
conducting multiple missile tests leading up to North Korea’s first nuclear weapons test in 
2006.99 The six party talks continued to sputter along until 2009, when the Obama administration 
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took office and North Korea attempted to launch a satellite into orbit, drawing the condemnation 
of the UNSC, to which North Korea responded by expelling all nuclear inspectors, declaring that 
it would no longer be bound by the Joint Statement and conducting a second nuclear weapons 
test, bringing an end to the Six Party talks.100 
B. Strategic Patience and the Obama Administration 
North Korea welcomed President Obama into office with its second nuclear weapons test 
in 2009, immediately escalating tensions with the new administration and pushing President 
Obama to adopt a strategy of ‘strategic patience’ with regard to North Korea.101  President 
Obama was determined to “break the cycle of provocation, extortion, and reward” that had come 
to define U.S.–North Korean relations.102  The theory behind strategic patience was to refrain 
from rewarding North Korea’s provocative behavior with concessions and making it clear to 
North Korea that the United States would only return to the negotiating table if North Korea 
displayed a willingness to take verifiable steps towards denuclearization.103  Strategic patience 
amounted to “essentially ignoring North Korea and waiting for North Korea to make the first 
move.”104 In the end, the two sides could not even meet each other’s preconditions for 
diplomacy, and North Korea detonated its fourth nuclear weapon in 2016 after the U.S. rejected 
North Korea’s offer to discuss a peace treaty without addressing denuclearization.105  Instead of 
engaging in direct negotiations with North Korea and rewarding North Korea for its provocatory 
actions, the Obama administration focused on deterrence and containment, reinforcing the U.S.’s 
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commitment to its allies in the region in South Korea and Japan and maintaining the stance that 
“the United States does not, and never will, accept North Korea as a nuclear state.”106  However, 
while Obama implemented strategic patience, North Korea continued to test ballistic missiles 
and nuclear bombs in violation of UNSC sanctions, leading the outgoing President Obama to 
warn the incoming President Trump that North Korea posed the biggest threat to U.S. national 
security and should be a foreign policy priority for the incoming administration.107 
C. Breaking the Cycle: ‘Fire and Fury’ and Trump’s Approach to North Korea 
Donald Trump’s presidency marked a dramatic departure from many of the presidential 
norms of previous administrations, including in foreign policy.108  Adopting an “America first” 
foreign policy, Trump backed away from traditional U.S. allies, threatened to pull out of NATO, 
and cozied up to leaders of authoritarian regimes.109 Foregoing the multilateral approach to North 
Korea adopted by most of his predecessors, President Trump favored a unilateral approach to the 
nuclear threat posed by North Korea comprised of insults, threats of nuclear war, and one-on-one 
summitry between himself and Kim Jong-un.110 Section C.1 details how President Trump and 
Kim Jong-un escalated tensions and threatened nuclear war prior to their first summit in 
Singapore.  Section C.2 then turns to the Singapore and Hanoi summits and the respective fallout 
from each. 
1. Insults, Threats of Nuclear War, and an Invitation to Talk 
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President Trump’s approach to North Korea began by responding to North Korean 
provocation by exchanging insults with Kim Jong-un and threatening nuclear war.  On July 28, 
2017, during a weapons test, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile that, for 
the first time, theoretically could target the U.S. mainland.111 In response to the international 
condemnation and increased sanctions following the test, North Korea promised retribution on 
the U.S., to which President Trump answered, “North Korea best not make any more threats to 
the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”112  As 
North Korea continued to test ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, Trump bucked tradition 
and further escalated tensions by threatening nuclear war.113 On September 19, 2017, in a speech 
to the U.N. General Assembly President Trump referred to Kim Jong-un as a “Rocket man on a 
suicide mission” and threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea if forced to defend the U.S. or 
its allies.114 In response to President Trump’s speech to the U.N., Kim Jong-un released an 
official statement calling President Trump a “dotard”, a “gangster fond of playing with fire,” and 
a “frightened dog.”115 Despite the name-calling and threats of nuclear war, in March of 2018 
Kim Jong-un extended an invitation to President Trump to discuss nuclear issues, which Trump 
accepted, leading to President Trump and Kim Jong-un’s first high-level summit in Singapore.116 
2. The Singapore and Hanoi Summits 
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On June 12, 2018, President Trump met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and 
became the first sitting U.S. president to meet in person with a North Korean leader.117 The 
summit produced a statement signed by both parties and contained four principle declarations: 
(1) The U.S. and North Korea commit to establish new diplomatic relations; (2) the U.S. and 
North Korea will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean 
Peninsula; (3) North Korea commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula; and (4) the U.S. and North Korea commit to recovering POW remains from the 
Korean War.118 In a press conference after the summit, President Trump also unilaterally pledged 
to suspend the annual U.S. – South Korean military exercises and announced that North Korea 
had promised to destroy a missile testing facility.119 After returning to the U.S. on June 13, 
President Trump declared that “everyone can feel much safer than the day I took office. There is 
no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.”120 
Despite President Trump’s assertion that there was no longer a nuclear threat from North 
Korea after the Singapore summit, the document itself utilized vague language and failed to 
impose any substantive obligations on North Korea in terms of denuclearization. The Singapore 
statement contains “no commitment to a declaration of weapons. There is no commitment to 
verification. There is no timeline.”121 In addition to the vague terms of the agreement, by meeting 
with Mr. Kim in a highly publicized summit, President Trump offered Kim Jong-un and his 
regime the international legitimacy and prestige it has long coveted, without requiring any 
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significant concessions in return.122 In fact, President Trump was the only one to make 
concessions when he pledged to suspend U.S. – South Korean military exercises, another long 
sought goal of North Korea.123  President Trump also praised Kim Jong-un, citing their “special 
bond” and later touting their “love letters” and the “beautiful letters” President Trump received 
from the North Korean leader.124 Victor Cha has also pointed out that “Singapore will be 
remembered as Kim’s coming out party as leader of the world’s newest nuclear weapons state. 
That will be the domestic narrative in North Korea.”125 
President Trump and Kim Jong-un left the Singapore summit with the intent to meet 
again to discuss denuclearization, and their second summit occurred on February 27 and 28, 
2019, in Hanoi, Vietnam.126 On February 28, President Trump and Mr. Kim cut off negotiations 
without reaching a deal on denuclearization.127 Reportedly, both President Trump and Mr. Kim 
asked for concessions the other side was not willing to give, with Kim asking for the removal of 
the recently imposed sanctions for a continued moratorium on weapons testing, a limit on 
nuclear stockpiles, and potentially shutting down the Yongbyon nuclear facility, while President 
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Despite leaving Hanoi without an agreement, and a widespread belief among scholars 
that President Trump’s highly publicized summits were largely a failure in terms of addressing 
North Korea’s nuclear threat, President Trump did demonstrate that North Korea will not engage 
in provocative action when they are engaged in negotiations, as evidenced by their self-imposed 
two-year moratorium on weapons tests in 2018 and 2019.129 President Trump’s approach to 
North Korea marked a dramatic departure from the approaches of previous U.S. administrations, 
and despite his claims to have solved the North Korean nuclear threat, President Trump left 
“behind a North Korea with a nuclear program that is more ambitious than ever, after touting his 
on-and-off diplomacy and ‘personal relationship’ with Mr. Kim.”130 
III. How the Biden Administration Should Move Forward with North Korea 
As the Biden administration nears the conclusion of its “full review” of the United States’ 
approach in regards to a nuclear North Korea, the international community will soon discover 
how President Biden plans to address North Korea moving forward.131  For its part, North Korea 
has maintained its animosity towards the new administration, recently claiming that President 
Biden made “a big blunder” by calling North Korea’s nuclear arsenal a threat to U.S. security 
and warning that the United States would face “a very grave situation” as long as it maintains its 
“hostile policy” towards the Kim regime.132  Thus far, the Biden administration has signaled that 
it is likely to chart a path between the comprehensive deal sought by Trump and the ‘strategic 
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patience’ of the Obama administration, instead relying on a “calibrated practical approach that is 
open to and will explore diplomacy” with North Korea.133  
While we wait to see how the Biden administration will implement its ‘practical 
approach’ to North Korea, here are a few steps the new administration should take to effectively 
address a nuclear North Korea.  Section III.A explains that for the sake of the NPT and the 
international legal nonproliferation regime, the Biden administration should maintain a public 
posture of the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, but understand that 
complete denuclearization is a long-term goal. Part III.B details how the new administration 
should continue to apply economic pressure and enforce the international sanctions regime 
against North Korea.  Part III.C addresses how the Biden administration should reengage with 
our strategic allies in the region to bolster deterrence and containment. And finally, Part III.D 
explains why the Biden administration should engage North Korea and pursue reciprocal and 
proportional measures that will foster stability and decrease tensions in the region. 
A. The Biden Administration Should Maintain a Public Stance of the Complete 
Denuclearization of North Korea 
 
The Biden administration should maintain a public posture that the United States seeks 
the complete, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea for the sake of the NPT and the 
international legal regime for nonproliferation.  Every U.S. presidential administration that has 
dealt with either the prospect or reality of a nuclear North Korea has adopted the stance that the 
United States is unwilling to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.134 Biden must do 
the same.   
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Accepting North Korea, a former state party to the NPT, as a de facto nuclear weapons 
state would strike a serious blow to the international nonproliferation regime.135  As previously 
discussed, the NPT already has systemic weaknesses and today “the NPT regime is widely 
regarded as a system in distress.”136  By maintaining a public stance that the United States will 
never accept North Korea as a NWS, the Biden administration can send a firm message to any 
current NNWS with potential aspirations of following in North Korea’s footsteps, i.e. 
withdrawing from the NPT and pursuing a nuclear weapon, that any such country will be met 
with condemnation instead of initial backlash followed by eventual acceptance of the country’s 
nuclear weapons.137 As Steven E. Miller has pointed out, “to many, the failure of the NPT system 
to prevent North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. . . is a disturbing symptom of the 
imperfection of the regime,” and backing away from the complete denuclearization of North 
Korea would send the wrong message to many “disgruntled [NNWS] states that believe their 
interests are not being served within the NPT system.”138  
The Biden administration should not back away from the complete denuclearization of 
North Korea, even if complete denuclearization is unrealistic in the short term.139  Kim Jong-un’s 
recent insistence that North Korea is a nuclear power and the cementation of nuclear arms in 
North Korea’s constitution signal that complete denuclearization is likely not in the cards for the 
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Biden administration and will not be a realistic solution any time soon.140  Negotiations at the 
Hanoi summit allegedly broke down after President Trump sought a comprehensive agreement 
dismantling North Korea’s entire nuclear weapons program, while Mr. Kim envisioned more 
meager concessions.141  If the Biden administration does engage North Korea, as discussed 
further below, it should make clear that while complete denuclearization of North Korea is the 
long-term goal, the administration is willing to bargain over more realistic, smaller steps and 
make reciprocal and proportional concessions that build trust, decrease tensions, and enhance 
stability in the region. In sum, the Biden administration should adhere to the longstanding U.S. 
position of the complete denuclearization of North Korea for the sake of  the NPT, with the 
understanding that complete denuclearization is something to work towards in tandem with 
short-term security assurances, not something Biden can expect North Korea to commit to before 
engaging in substantive negotiations.  
B. Continue to Pursue and Enforce the International Sanctions Regime With a 
Caveat 
 
It is imperative that the Biden administration continue to pursue and enforce the 
international sanctions regime against North Korea, but with the understanding that economic 
pressure is a means to get North Korea back to the negotiating table, not a solution in and of 
itself.142 Since the UNSC imposed its first sanctions on North Korea in 2006 following North 
Korea’s first nuclear test, we have seen that sanctions alone have not been an effective tool in 
preventing North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons.143 The international sanctions regime 
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has, however, inflicted heavy costs on North Korea, as evidenced by the fact that North Korea’s 
revenues from exports to China crashed by almost ninety percent in 2018 following the last 
round of major UNSC sanctions.144  Similarly, it is telling that Kim Jong-un requested sanctions 
relief in return for any further concessions on denuclearization during the Hanoi summit.145  
Further, North Korea has imposed what is likely its harshest economic burden on itself, when it 
completely shut down its borders in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.146 There is little 
question that North Korea is beginning to feel the extended detrimental effects of both sanctions 
and the pandemic.147  
The Hanoi summit between Trump and Kim Jong-un demonstrated that North Korea is 
willing to offer at least partial rollbacks of its nuclear program in return for sanctions relief.148 
While President Trump rejected the offer in Hanoi, it is clear that North Korea is willing to 
negotiate over incremental sanctions relief in return for incremental rollbacks that could “not 
only reduce security risks in the near term, but also pave the way for broader diplomatic 
solutions down the road.”149  China has signaled that they are more concerned with regime 
stability and having a relatively stable anti–U.S. ally on their border than enforcing sanctions.150  
And, as long as China is willing to “act as a thermostat, ensuring that the heat never gets too high 
on their neighbor,” sanctions alone will prove futile.151  While sanctions and economic pressure 
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have not proved to be a particularly useful tool by themselves, sanctions offer the Biden 
administration valuable leverage and bargaining chips in any future negotiations with North 
Korea, and the Biden administration should continue to encourage the enforcement of the 
international sanctions regime and continue to enforce unilateral U.S. sanctions as means to an 
end, to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table.152 
C. Reengage with Japan and South Korea to Bolster Deterrence and Containment of 
North Korea’s Nuclear Threat.  
 
While Donald Trump pursued a unilateral course of action with North Korea, the Biden 
administration should reengage with our allies in the region, namely Japan and South Korea, to 
bolster deterrence in the region and contain North Korea’s nuclear threat.153  Indeed, while 
Trump backed away from traditional allies and bickered with South Korea over defense costs, 
the Biden administration has already signaled that it plans to reengage with South Korea and 
Japan and lean on international alliances to help deal with the growing threat posed by North 
Korea.154 Maintaining stable relationships with Japan and South Korea is essential to combat the 
steady increase of Chinese influence on North Korea and the fact that China’s goals in regard to 
North Korea differ drastically from U.S. objectives.155 
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The good news, as Korean expert David Chang notes, is that deterrence has 
overwhelmingly shown itself to be effective in curbing the threat of a nuclear North Korea, and 
deterrence will likely continue to work moving forward.156  Kang argues that “North Korea poses 
almost no threat of major war to South Korea or the United States as long as the outside world 
does not attack first. . . Kim Jong-un may be many things, but he is not suicidal.”157  North Korea 
demonstrated the ability to destroy all of South Korea and most of Japan, yet there is also little 
chance that North Korea will ever strike first, as Kim Jong-un does not want to start a war he 
knows he will lose.158  Similarly, it is highly unlikely that the United States, Japan, or South 
Korea would ever preemptively attack North Korea due to the fact that any such attack would 
result in millions of South Korean, Japanese, and American deaths before North Korea could be 
subdued.159  With North Korean leadership that has consistently prioritized regime survival over 
all else, as long as the United States, Japan, and South Korea maintain a commitment to trilateral 
defense, where an attack on one is an attack on all, it follows that North Korea will be deterred 
from actually carrying out an attack.160   
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, 
Brad Roberts, argues that the credibility of the United States’ promises to defend its allies from a 
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North Korean attack and to respond as necessary has eroded under the Trump administration.161  
If Roberts is correct, the time is ripe for the Biden administration to reassure Japan and South 
Korea that the United States is committed to their defense and that deterrence will hold.  The 
political obstacles to trilateral defense may be substantial, especially with the strained history 
between Tokyo and Seoul, but the North Korean threat is likely to take precedence over such 
concerns.162  By recommitting to our traditional alliances with Japan and South Korea through 
activities such as the deployment of strategic assets, missile defense systems, and returning to 
joint-military exercises with South Korea, the Biden administration can make it clear to North 
Korea that if they were to carry out an attack on the United States or its allies that they will be 
met with complete destruction.163  While a morbid thought, the theory goes that North Korea has 
put themselves in a box of their own making, and as long as deterrence holds both sides should 
be effectively dissuaded from violence.164  By strengthening our alliances with Japan and South 
Korea and bolstering U.S. deterrence and containment capabilities, the Biden administration can 
pursue diplomatic engagement with a reduced threat of a North Korean attack.165 
D. Convey a Willingness to Engage North Korea and Pursue Reciprocal and 
Proportional Concessions. 
 
With sanctions and deterrence measures in place, the Biden administration should then 
remain open to, and even convey a desire, to open diplomatic channels between the two 
countries and engage North Korea in substantive negotiations over their nuclear program and 
arsenal of nuclear weapons.  Previous U.S. administrations diplomatic efforts largely consisted 
of refusing to make any concessions until North Korea takes significant steps to denuclearize.166  
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Even President Trump, who altered the traditional playbook and met with Kim Jong-un himself, 
made it clear in Hanoi that any concessions from the United States would only come after 
complete denuclearization.167  But while understanding that complete denuclearization can 
remain a long-term goal, the Biden administration must be ready and willing to deal with a 
nuclear armed North Korea and willing to take incremental steps to stabilize the region and 
decrease the threat of nuclear war.168  Expecting Kim Jong-un to commit to complete 
denuclearization and give up the nuclear arsenal that he views as essential to the regime’s 
survival is unrealistic.169  And the situation could continue to get worse if the Biden 
administration does not adopt a more pragmatic approach.170  Previous U.S. administrations have 
made the perfect the enemy of the good, and “missed several opportunities in the past to manage 
incremental risks so as to prevent the situation from worsening.”171  
With this backdrop, the Biden administration should engage North Korea in incremental, 
reciprocal, and proportional concessions.172 Simultaneous concessions could provide “tangible 
progress in addressing each side’s security concerns [which] then help provide the foundation, 
trust, and momentum for additional gains down the road.”173  The Biden administration will have 
to decide exactly what it is willing to pay, but the administration could consider offering some 
sanctions relief, or a halt in U.S.–South Korean military exercises in return for a verifiable freeze 
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on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.174  Or, the Biden administration could pursue a 
deal with an eye towards arms reduction.175 Or, Biden could revive the offer Kim Jong-un put 
forth to Trump, dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for partial sanctions 
relief.176  Each of these steps could offer short-term security benefits, and “each step that is taken 
down that road can make the subsequent steps toward reconciliation more realistic.”177  The basis 
behind these incremental steps is that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons and 
nuclear program until its security can be assured, and “such assurance cannot be achieved simply 
but an American promise or an agreement on paper, it will require a substantial period of co-
existence and interdependence.”178  However the Biden administration decides to move forward, 
it is clear that engagement is the best strategy.179  An engaged North Korea is less hostile, and 
engagement decreases tensions and reduces the threat of violence, and the Biden administration 
should engage North Korea and be willing to move forward with incremental, proportional 
concessions on the road towards complete denuclearization.180 
Conclusion 
 While there is no easy solution to dealing with the threat of a nuclear North Korea, the 
Biden administration cannot ignore the problem and hope it simply goes away.181  The Biden 
administration should pursue engagement with North Korea while simultaneously enforcing the 
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UNSC sanctions regime and recommitting to the defense of South Korea and Japan and extended 
deterrence. And, although the complete denuclearization of North Korea is no longer a realistic 
goal for the short-term, the Biden administration should maintain the public posture of the 
complete denuclearization of North Korea for the sake of the NPT and the international legal 
regime for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
